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In the 1990s, the Army closed 112 of its bases in the United States and realigned another 27, 
saving an estimated $3.1 billion.  The next round of military Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) will occur in 2005.  Optimal Stationing of Army Forces (OSAF) is an optimization-
based decision-support model adopted by the Army to support its 2005 BRAC. 
 
1. ARMY STATIONING, OPTIMIZATION AND BRAC 
The Army frequently plans adjustments to the stationing of its force structure as weapon 
systems, missions, and operations change over time, much as a large corporation plans changes 
to its plant infrastructure as product demand and technology change over time.  Optimization 
models have long played a key role in developing these corporate plans (for example, see Brown 
et al [2001] and their references).  On any given day, the Army has up to 100 units moving to 
meet new stationing requirements and our decision-support model, Optimal Stationing of Army 
Forces (OSAF), has recently helped guide some of these decisions in the United States.  For 
example, OSAF suggested potential locations for rotary-wing training, and also helped determine 
a new home for the United States Army Southern Command.   
The Army is legislatively more encumbered in its infrastructure decisions than corporate 
counterparts.  A complex, politically insulated process for closing and realigning military 
installations in the United States is provided by Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510 (the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991) as amended.  This act established an 
independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and set in motion a process 
known as BRAC for 1991, 1993, and 1995, to be applied to installations in the United States.  
The law authorizing these three rounds has been remarkably successful in allowing the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to eliminate excess infrastructure [Government Accounting 
Office 2001].  Since 1995, the DOD has urged Congress to authorize additional BRAC rounds 
and in 2002 received authorization for a round in 2005.   
The Army will use OSAF to support its 2005 BRAC round. 
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 OSAF prescribes an optimal Army stationing plan for a given force structure, set of 
installations, available implementation dollars, and stationing restrictions such as: “the National 
Training Center is fixed at Fort Irwin,” “the Old Guard is fixed at Fort Myer,” and “ensure 
Apache helicopter training is restricted to Forts Bliss, Carson, and/or Hood.”  Each stationing 
plan must satisfy many unit requirements (for example, availability of buildings and ranges 
necessary to train a unit) and is evaluated with a set of quantitative and qualitative metrics.  
Reviews by Army leadership and over 60 presentations to Army general officers and their 
civilian counterparts over the last two years have helped us decide which stationing restrictions, 
unit requirements, and quantitative metrics to include, which to ignore, and which comparisons 
are better left for posterior expert judgment; in making these decisions, we must frequently 
balance tradeoffs between detail and tractability.  
The Army has long used integer linear programming (see definition below) to help make 
stationing decisions, with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and Center for Army Analysis 
playing a significant role in its use.  Dell et al [1994] and Loerch et al [1996] describe some early 
work.  The NPS theses by Gezer [2001] and Bayram [2002] describe integer linear programs to 
help the Army with stationing and infrastructure consolidation.  Tarantino [2002] reports on a 
recent OSAF application.  Dell [1998] and recent NPS theses by Oremis [2000] and Ardic [2001] 
describe integer linear programs to help the Army implement BRAC decisions. 
What’s an integer linear program? 
Optimal Stationing of Army Forces (OSAF) includes an integer linear 
program that can be expressed in the following form: 
 minimizex  cx 
 subject to Ax = b, x ≥ 0 , 
   xj ∈{0,1} ∀ j ∈R, 
where c and x are n-vectors, b is an m-vector, A is an m×n matrix, and R is an
index set of binary variables.  An instance of the program is specified by the data
(c, b, and A).  For a typical OSAF instance, m is about 44,000, n is about 70,000,
and R contains about 2,800 elements.  It takes about five minutes to optimally
solve a typical instance using commercially available optimization software.
Connors, Dell and Tarantino [2002] provide additional detail.  
 
2. OSAF INSTALLATIONS AND UNITS 
 
The Army categorizes its installations by primary mission into 13 types, but OSAF addresses 
only the five types at which the preponderance of United States soldiers are stationed:   
o maneuver,  
o command and control,  
o professional schools,  
o major training areas, and  
o training schools.  
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 OSAF models each installation’s available heavy and light maneuver training capacity, ranges, 
and other facilities, and unit requirements for these assets.  For year 2009, we are stationing a 
force structure consisting of more than 3,500 major units at over 60 installations and training 
areas, as well as 11 major leased facilities.  OSAF also models National Guard and Reserve 
Component requirements. 
OSAF must account for the building types and ranges that are required by units stationed at 
an installation (unit requirements).  The Army divides its building types and ranges into 353 
facility category groups (FCGs), which are inventoried in the Army Real Property Planning and 
Analysis System.  However, only a handful of these 353 FCGs provide the majority of the square 
footage that units require.  For example, 25 FCGs comprise 80% of all square footage of 
buildings in the Army, while 50 FCGs comprise approximately 90%.  
Most OSAF model instances consider 39 FCGs aggregated into the following nine groups:  
o operations,  
o administrative,  
o aviation maintenance,  
o vehicle maintenance,  
o supply and storage,  
o training instruction (active force),  
o community facilities,  
o unique facilities, and  
o enlisted unaccompanied housing.   
 The Installation Status Report provides a quality rating (green for good, yellow for fair, and 
red for poor) for each square foot of each FCG at each installation.  OSAF combines these 
groups into “green” and “other” and ensures that any unit moved to a new installation is given  
green-rated facilities or new construction.  If only other-rated facilities are available for a moved 
unit, a cost to upgrade existing facilities to green-rated is applied in the model.  OSAF does not 
upgrade facilities for units whose stationing does not change (units that do not move) and 
assumes that no green-rated facilities are evacuated by units leaving an installation unless all 
other-rated facilities are evacuated. 
OSAF uses maneuver and range-day requirements from the Installation Training 
Capacity/Army Range Requirements Model (ITC/ARRM).  Most OSAF model instances 
encompass the 18 range types given the most importance in the ITC.  Range requirements are 
expressed in range-days and maneuver land requirements are expressed in kilometer2-days.  
OSAF usually restricts the deviation between the required and available training assets, and in so 
doing it ensures that moving units do not increase training asset shortfalls.  A subset of units can 
train at installations to which they are not assigned, proximity allowing.  
3. OSAF COSTS  
OSAF typically minimizes the 20-year Net Present Value (NPV) of stationing a given force 
structure.  Consistent with prior stationing analyses, OSAF considers both recurring and  
one-time costs.  Recurring costs are further divided into fixed and variable costs. 
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 Fixed costs occur regardless of the number of soldiers on an installation and include certain 
operating costs for garrison activities (for example, fire protection, grounds maintenance) and 
minimum community facilities (for example, fitness centers, medical facilities).  Cost factors and 
relationships are obtained from standard Army sources such as the Unit Relocation Cost Model 
and the Installation Status Report. 
 
Every unit stationed on an installation generates a variable cost for installation operations, 
which OSAF implements as a cost per soldier or civilian assigned to the installation.  OSAF uses 
variable costs based on these cost categories: 
 
o base operating support,  
o sustainment repair and modernization,  
o medical,  
o locality pay, and  
o housing operations and allowances.   
 
All stationing actions that include the movement of a unit or closure of an installation incur 
one-time costs in military construction (MILCON), transportation, and program management.  If 
an installation that receives a new unit does not have the required green-rated facilities or ranges 
available, then a one-time MILCON cost is assessed for new construction or an upgrade from 
other-rated facilities, if such facilities are available. 
 
 All unit movements also incur a one-time transportation cost that includes the movement of 
civilians, equipment, military families, and the military unit. 
4. EVALUATING A STATIONING PLAN 
 
OSAF creates an optimal stationing plan while considering unit requirements, stationing 
restrictions and costs.  But stationing a force structure is a complex problem that should be 
evaluated using many criteria, not all of which can be incorporated in the model.  Hence, a post-
optimization review of a proposed plan is normally carried out using these six metrics. 
 
o NPV and Investment is the 20-year NPV of the stationing plan, as well as the  
one-time cost for transportation, MILCON, and program management. 
 
o Complexity is measured by the number of units moved. 
 
o Joint Possibilities reveal the impact on inter-Service stationing, as suggested by the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) and others, stressing the importance of 
installation use by more than one Service in future stationing analyses.  (We are 
currently investigating how to expand OSAF for use with the other Services.) 
 
o Utilization Factors are reported for facilities, ranges, and lands where a low 
utilization rate could justify mothballing or demolition of facilities. 
 
o Impact Assessment is more subjective and incorporates a review panel’s guidance 
on issues that are difficult to capture in OSAF such as: strategic implications, quality 
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 of life, environment, and ease of mobilization or deployment.  Strategic implications 
represent, mainly from a geographical perspective, the Army’s ability to fulfill its 
mission.  For example, the Army cannot station all of its forces on one coastline (even 
if that appeared to be cost effective).  We examine quality of life using standard Army 
metrics for an installation and its surrounding community.  Environmental assessment 
includes remediation costs and involves analysis using standard Army models.  For 
unit deployment and mobilization requirements, we determine if the stationing of a 
large maneuver force will stress existing deployment infrastructure (for example, 
railheads, airfields) and training infrastructure (for example, ranges) at the unit’s new 
location. 
 
o Other.  Each installation has its own set of “special considerations.”  If these are 




OSAF’s prescribed plans have produced many insights, but we have also learned much in 
gathering and analyzing the input data and by building the model.  Insights are gained more 
easily because all assumptions and constraints for each scenario are documented and stated 
explicitly, every optimized plan automatically satisfies the myriad details expressed in the 
underlying constraints, and every proposed solution is the best that can be achieved under the 
circumstances.   
 
In 1997, GAO concluded that the “DOD continues to maintain large amounts of excess 
infrastructure, especially in its support functions, such as maintenance depots, research and 
development laboratories, and test and evaluation centers.”  We have found excess infrastructure 
in the OSAF-evaluated installation types, but not to the extent that GAO reports in support 
installations. 
Our analysis shows it is possible to mitigate, to a degree, the imbalance of training land 
throughout the Army.  When we examine today’s overall Army, there is enough total training 
land, but with the current stationing, numerous installations cannot meet their unit requirements.  
By moving units, we can improve the balance between available land and unit requirements, but 
data indicate that just a few installations encompass the majority of training land.  Thus, full 
utilization of this land would require extensive relocation and implementation costs, including 
MILCON.  For example, installations in Alaska comprise over 50% of the Army’s light 
maneuver land and over 30% of its total maneuver land, but it is not the ideal location for the 
preponderance of United States forces (even if we ignore strategic issues).  Alaska is also one of 
the highest-cost areas and imposes strict environmental restrictions.     
Army unit realignments and base closures have the potential to save the Army billions of 
dollars (NPV), but savings are not realized for many years because of initial implementation 
costs.  Figure 1 represents eight different hypothetical stationing plans that each minimize NPV 
subject to a different implementation budget.  Each point in the graph is a stationing alternative 
and represents the 20-year NPV (y-axis, $billions) at different implementation costs (x-axis, 
$billions).  The origin is the status quo, with zero implementation cost and no savings.  In the 
solutions presented in Figure 1, an investment of about $1.5 billion provides most of the possible  
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Figure 1.  For these hypothetical stationing plans, an investment of $1.5 billion yields most 
of the maximum possible 20-year NPV savings. 
 
6. UNCERTAIN DATA AND INTANGIBLES  
Many man-years have been devoted to gathering and analyzing OSAF data.  Despite the 
substantial effort, we are mindful of many limitations in this data and limitations imposed by 
other intangibles:   
o BRAC costs.  The costs forecasted for past BRAC actions have been hard to 
reconcile with subsequent actual costs [GAO 1997].   
o Economic assistance.  OSAF does not consider the cost of assistance to local 
communities to overcome realignment impacts.  Although these costs may be 
substantial, they are also difficult to estimate in advance of any announced action 
[GAO 1996]. 
o Environmental costs.  One of the largest costs DOD can face at an installation is for 
environmental remediation.  GAO [1997] states that “we have concurred with DOD 
not considering these costs in developing its cost and savings estimates as a basis for 
base closure recommendations.  At the same time, we agree with DOD’s position that 
environmental restoration costs are a liability to it regardless of its base closure 
decisions; and we note, these costs are substantial.” 
o Environmental issues other than cost.  Unfortunately, there are many 
environmental factors that can impact a stationing decision.  For example, 
encroachment, due to growth in the installation’s local community, can complicate 
new construction.  Other installations may have long-term waivers or permits that 
could influence mission accomplishment.  Such issues must be carefully investigated 
for any BRAC recommendation. 
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 Armed with solutions to hundreds of OSAF scenarios, along with post-solution analyses and 
adjustments by experts, we can better understand and help mitigate the consequences of 
intangibles and uncertain cost estimates.   
 
7. SUMMARY AND FUTURE USE  
OSAF addresses a complex problem, a stationing analysis of the United States Army.  OSAF 
quickly prescribes an optimal stationing plan for a given set of inputs and stationing restrictions.   
 
We have continuously refined OSAF based on reviews by the Army leadership, our analyses 
to support the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, several case study analyses, and our studies to 
support the most recent Army stationing decisions.   
Many in DOD have suggested that all Services would benefit from a joint analysis using 
OSAF.  We agree that there is much to gain from a joint OSAF effort, but we hasten to warn that 
developing the data and details necessary to support such a large-scale decision in reasonable 
detail requires significant, continuing commitment and resources.  The Army has made this 
commitment, and as a result of using optimization, enjoys additional benefits:   
 
o All assumptions and constraints for each scenario are documented and stated 
explicitly.  This means that each stake-holder can state a case on a level playing field, 
with transparency to all others. 
 
o Every optimized plan satisfies the myriad details expressed in the underlying 
constraints.  This means that valid comparisons between competing plans can be 
made quickly.  
 
o Every proposed solution is the best that can be achieved under the circumstances.  
This is a comfort when dealing with contentious decisions involving huge amounts of 
our national treasure. 
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